Statutory Interpretation
- teachlawhub
- 5 days ago
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What is Statutory Interpretation?
Before we begin our exploration of the different rules of interpretation, it is important to know why statutory interpretation exists in our legal system. To understand this topic, we must first understand that Acts of Parliament are laws made by Parliament and they are the main source of law in the UK. Once an Act has been passed, it is the role of judges to apply the laws and rules contained within the Act when deciding cases. Judges do not create new law when interpreting statutes; instead, their role is to work out what Parliament intended the words of the Act to mean and then apply that meaning to the facts of the case before them. This process is known as statutory interpretation.
Statutory interpretation is the process that judges use to work out what Parliament meant when it wrote an Act of Parliament. When judges decide cases, they must read the words and phrases in legislation and apply them to the facts in front of them. This is not always straightforward. Judges are not allowed to make up new law, so instead they interpret the words Parliament has already used and then apply that meaning to the case.
Judges need to interpret Acts of Parliament for several reasons. First, legislation is often drafted in broad terms so it can cover many situations. Second, some words can be ambiguous and have more than one meaning. There may also be drafting errors. In addition, society changes over time and new developments may arise that Parliament did not foresee when the Act was created. Finally, the meaning of language can change, so words used many years ago may not mean exactly the same thing today.
To help with this process, judges have developed four main rules of statutory interpretation:
· the literal rule,
· the golden rule,
· the mischief rule and
· the purposive rule.
Each rule takes a slightly different approach to interpreting the words of an Act of Parliament. We will now explore each rule and cases where the rule has been used by judges.
The Literal Rule
The literal rule requires judges to give words in an Act of Parliament their literal meaning. This means the plain, grammatical, natural and ordinary dictionary meaning of the word or phrase. Judges may use a dictionary to find this meaning, and importantly, they should use a dictionary from the year the Act was passed. The literal rule should be the judge’s starting point, even if applying it leads to an absurd or unfair result.
A good example is Harris (1836) The defendant bit off the victim’s nose during a violent attack. The statute made it an offence to “stab, cut or wound” another person. Using the literal rule, the judges focused on the ordinary dictionary meaning of the words stab, cut and wound. They decided that these words suggested the use of an instrument or weapon. As the injury was caused by biting, not by an implement, the defendant was found not guilty.
In London and North Eastern Railway v Berriman (1946 Mr Berriman was killed while carrying out routine maintenance work on a railway line. His widow claimed compensation under the Act, which allowed compensation for workers killed while “relaying or repairing” the tracks. The judges applied the literal rule and examined the literal, ordinary, dictionary meaning of these words. They decided that maintaining the tracks was not the same as relaying or repairing them and therefor maintaining did not fall under the literal definition of the phrase relaying and repairing. As a result, Mrs Berriman was unable to claim compensation.
Another important case is Whiteley v Chappell (1868). The defendant voted in an election using the voting card of a man who had already died. The statute made it an offence to impersonate a person who was entitled to vote. Applying the literal rule, the judges decided that literally a dead person is not legally entitled to vote. Therefore, the defendant had not committed the offence and was found not guilty.
In Fisher v Bell (1961) a shopkeeper displayed a flick knife in his shop window with a price label. The Act made it a criminal offence to “offer for sale” an offensive weapon. The judges used the literal rule and relied on contract law principles, deciding that displaying goods in a shop window is an invitation to treat, not a legal offer for sale. As a result, the defendant was found not guilty.
The Golden Rule
The golden rule is a modification of the literal rule. It is only used when applying the literal meaning would lead to an absurd or unjust outcome. Here the judge can use the golden rule to avoid that result.
There are two approaches to the golden rule: the narrow approach and the wider approach.
The narrow approach is used when a word or phrase has more than one literal meaning. The judges will then choose the meaning that avoids the absurd result.
In R v Allen (1872) the defendant had gone through a second marriage ceremony while still legally married to his first wife. The Act made it an offence to “marry” while already married. Using the narrow approach of the golden rule, the judges decided that the word marry could have two meanings: becoming legally married or going through a marriage ceremony. To avoid an absurd result where no one could ever be guilty of bigamy, they chose the second meaning and found the defendant guilty.
The wider approach is used when a word has only one literal meaning, but applying it would lead to an absurd result. Judges can then modify the meaning to avoid that outcome.
In Adler v George (1964) the defendant was found protesting inside a prohibited RAF base. The Official Secrets Act 1920 made it an offence to obstruct the armed forces “in the vicinity of” a prohibited place. Literally, the phrase in the vicinity of did not include being inside the base. Using the wider approach of the golden rule, the judges modified the meaning of in the vicinity of to include being inside the prohibited place, and the defendant was found guilty.
Another example is Re Sigsworth (1935) A son murdered his mother and then attempted to inherit her property as her next of kin. Under the Administration of Justice Act 1925, a deceased person’s estate would normally pass to their next of kin. Applying the literal rule would have allowed the murderer to benefit from his own crime and this would cause an absurd result. Using the wider approach of the golden rule, the judges modified the meaning of the phrase “next of kin” so that it did not include a person who had unlawfully killed the deceased. As a result, the son was prevented from inheriting the estate.
The Mischief Rule
The mischief rule comes from Heydon’s Case (1584).
This rule requires judges to look at the problem, or mischief, in the old law that Parliament was trying to fix. A mischief is a problem with the old law. Judges should consider:
1) What was the previous common law?
2) What was the problem (‘mischief’) that the old common law did not cover?
3) How had Parliament tried to rectify the mischief in the old Law in the new Act?
4) How can the courts fulfil Parliament's intentions in this
This means that judges should ask four key questions when using the mischief rule, what was the law before the Act, what was the problem with that law, how did Parliament try to fix it, and how should the court interpret the Act to achieve Parliament’s intention.
In Smith v Hughes (1960) the defendants were prostitutes who attempted to attract customers by calling to them from balconies and windows overlooking the street. The Street Offences Act 1959 made it an offence to solicit “in a street or public place”. Using the mischief rule, the judges identified that Parliament’s intention was to prevent public nuisance and clean up the streets. They interpreted public place to include balconies and windows visible from the street, and the defendants were found guilty.
In Royal College of Nursing v DHSS (1981) here nurses were carrying out part of an abortion procedure by administering drugs under the supervision of a doctor. The Abortion Act 1967 stated that abortions must be carried out by a "registered medical practitioner", judges had to decide if a nurse fell within this definition. The judges used the mischief rule and identified that Parliament’s intention was to prevent unsafe, illegal backstreet abortions. They interpreted the wording to allow nurses to perform part of the procedure lawfully, provided a doctor remained responsible overall.
In DPP v Bull (1995) a man was charged under a law that made it an offence for a “common prostitute” to loiter or solicit in a public place. The courts had to decide if this definition applied to both male and female prostitutes. The court applied the mischief rule and considered that Parliament created this law to solve the mischief of controlling prostitution in public places. However, they concluded that the wording of the Act only applied to female prostitutes. As a result, the defendant was found not guilty, revealing a gap in the legislation.
The Purposive Rule
The purposive rule goes beyond the mischief rule. Instead of focusing only on the problem in the old law, judges consider the overall purpose and intention of Parliament when the Act was created. Judges interpret the law in a way that best achieves that purpose. The purposive approach is also commonly used when interpreting EU and international law.
In Coltman v Bibby Tankers (1987) a ship sank due to defects, killing several employees. Their families sought compensation, and the court had to decide whether a ship counted as “equipment” under the Act. Using the purposive rule, the judges identified that Parliament’s intention was to protect employees from the dangers of defective equipment. They interpreted the word equipment to include the ship itself.
In R (Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health (2003) the House of Lords considered whether embryos created through cell nuclear replacement (cloning) were covered by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. When the Act was passed, embryos could only be created through fertilisation. Using the purposive rule, the judges decided that Parliament would have intended to regulate all live human embryos, including those created by scientific advances. As a result, cloned embryos were included within the definition.
In Jones v Tower Boot Co Ltd (1997), an employee was subjected to serious racial abuse by colleagues at work, including verbal insults and physical harassment. He brought a claim under the Race Relations Act 1976, which stated that employers could be held responsible for discriminatory acts carried out by employees “in the course of employment”. The employer argued that the behaviour did not count because it was not part of the employees’ job roles. The judges applied the purposive rule and focused on what Parliament intended the Act to achieve. They decided that the purpose of the Act was to prevent discrimination in the workplace and protect employees. As a result, the phrase in the course of employment was interpreted broadly to include racist behaviour that took place at work, even if it was not authorised by the employer. The employer was therefore held liable for the employees’ actions.
Finally, in R v Registrar-General, ex parte Smith (1990) Smith was a violent offender detained in Broadmoor who wished to access information about his birth mother. Although the Act gave adopted people the right to obtain this information, judges used the purposive rule and decided that Parliament could not have intended this right to be exercised where it would pose a serious risk to others. As a result, Smith was denied access to the information.
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